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The proportion of workers covered by  pensions has increased very 
substantially over the past two or three decades, and in particular the 
number of older workers with pensions continues to increase. During 
the  same period, and especially  in  the past  decade, the labor force 
participation  of  older workers has declined  dramatically. The juxta- 
position of these two trends suggests the possibility that they may be 
related. In this paper, we examine the stipulations of private pension 
plans with a view to analyzing the incentive effects created by their 
provisions. We  find pension plans provide very substantial incentives 
to terminate work at the current job after the age of early retirement 
and even greater incentives to leave after the age of normal retirement. 
While analysis of the plan provisions suggests a potentially large effect 
of  pension plans on labor force participation, the evidence does not 
directly demonstrate that pension-related  work incentives did indeed 
cause workers to leave the labor force earlier. Such conclusions must 
rely on the association of individual retirement decisions with the pro- 
visions of individual pension plans-an  analysis that must await data 
as yet withheld from public use. Nonetheless, examination of the struc- 
ture of pension plans suggests the likelihood of a very sizable effect of 
plan provisions on labor force participation. The analysis of plan pro- 
visions also allows inferences about the cost in pension benefits of job 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at  Boston University and research 
associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Wise is John F. Stambaugh 
Professor of Political Economy, John F.  Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni- 
versity, and research associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Gary  Heaton  accomplished  the  very  substantial programming task  that  the  paper 
required and served as a continuous source of information, explanation, and expertise. 
We  thank Tom Gustafson for his very helpful comments. 
283 284  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
change. In addition, the examination of plan provisions allows consid- 
eration of the differential cost of pension plans for men versus women. 
The wide diversity of  plans and the corresponding wide diversity of 
the pension-related work incentives is a major theme of the paper. 
In an earlier paper Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) emphasized the ap- 
parent  inconsistency of pension  accrual profiles with a spot market 
view of the labor market. The evidence in this paper, particularly the 
analysis of  post-normal  retirement benefit accrual and supplemental 
benefit formulas, provides even stronger demonstration of  the incon- 
sistency.  In  contrast  to the  earlier paper,  which considered only  a 
limited number  of  plans  with earnings-related  benefit formulas, this 
paper includes the entire universe of  defined benefit pension plans. 
10.1  Background 
10.1.1 
Information on the value of annual vested accrual pension benefits 
for workers of different ages and with different amounts of  service is 
useful for displaying a variety  of  pension  incentive effects.  Vested 
pension benefit accrual at age a, Z(a), equals the difference between 
pension wealth at age a  + 1, Pw(a + l), and pension wealth at age a, 
Pw(a), accumulated to age a  +  1  at the nominal interest rate r, that 
is, 
(1) 
Pension wealth at age a  is defined as the expected  value  of  vested 
pension benefits discounted to age a. Intuitively PW(a)  can be thought 
of as the worker’s pension bank account. If l(a)  equals zero, the worker 
continuing employment with the plan sponsor at age a has exactly the 
same pension wealth at age a +  1  as an identically situated worker 
who terminates employment at age a. Pension accrual is thus the in- 
crement to pension wealth in  excess of the return on the previously 
accumulated pension bank account. Throughout the paper we express 
pension accrual increments as a fraction of the worker’s wage,  W(a). 
Specifically R(a,t)  denotes the ratio of Z(a) to W(a)  for a worker age a 
with t years of  service. 
The appendix presents  formulas for pension  benefit  accrual for a 
very simple defined benefit pension plan, emphasizing the change in 
the formula at ages of full or partial vesting, at early retirement age, 
and after noral retirement. This analysis explains why many pension 
age-accrual profiles show sizable discontinuities at vesting and at early 
and normal retirement. It is useful here to provide a brief summary of 
Vested Pension Benefit Accrual Profiles 
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the iinplications of these formulas. The discontinuities in age accrual 
profiles associated with vesting are fairly obvious; in the case of  cliff 
vesting (100% vesting occurring at a particular age) Pw(a)  in (1) equals 
zero prior to the age of vesting and suddenly becomes positive at the 
full vesting age. Hence l(a)  is zero prior to cliff vesting and rises to a 
positive value at the cliff vesting age, a*; on the other hand, Z(a*  + 1) 
is smaller than Z(a*) because it represents the difference in two pension 
wealth numbers, rather than simply the value of one, Pw(a*). 
Another discontinuity in Z(a) occurs, for most plans, at early retire- 
ment. This discontinuity occurs for plans that reduce early retirement 
benefits using a formula that is less than actuarially fair, and the lower 
the reduction the greater the decline in Z(a). To see this note that prior 
to the early retirement age Pw(a)  is not influenced by the early retire- 
ment reduction rate since workers are assumed to start collecting their 
vested benefits at the most lucrative date, which is almost invariably 
the age of early retirement; taking benefits at early retirement generally 
provides a larger present value of vested pension benefits accrued up 
to this age than opting to begin collecting these accrued benefits later. 
This reflects the use by pension plans of reduction rates in computing 
early retirement benefits that typically are lower than the actuarial rate. 
While Pw(a) and Z(a) are independent of the reduction rate prior to 
early retirement, they are both functions of the reduction factor after 
early retirement.  The smaller the reduction factor, the closer Pw(a) 
will be to Pw(a + l), holding other factors constant, and the smaller 
will be Z(a). This is important since the reduction factors of most plans 
are fairly small, providing substantially less than an actuarial reduction. 
A second, more fundamental reason for smaller increments after the 
early retirement age involves discounting. Prior to early retirement an 
extra dollar of  benefits has a higher present value in the Pw(a +  1) 
formula than in the Pw(a)  formula because at age a  + 1 the worker is 
1 year closer to receipt of these additional benefits than at age a. After 
the early retirement age benefits are available immediately and,  ignoring 
the worker’s shortening life span, an extra dollar of  benefits at age 
a + 1 has the same present value as an extra dollar at age a. Stated 
differently, after early retirement there is no special advantage from 
raising benefits next year over this year because, like additional benefits 
earned next year, additional benefits earned this year become available 
immediately. This lack of discounting after benefits are available raises 
Pw(a) relative to Pw(a + 1) which implies a smaller annual pension 
accrual, Z(a), and smaller values of R(a,t). 
A  third factor leading to a drop in  Z(a) at early  retirement is the 
shorter life span during which benefits will be collected if  retirement 
from the plan is postponed. This factor does not enter into the calculus 286  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
for Z(a)  prior to early retirement because, conditional on reaching early 
retirement, both Pw(a +  1) and Pw(a) are based on the same potential 
life span of the worker. 
Each of these three factors also plays a role in the significant decline 
in Z(a) at normal retirement. Most pension plans do not increase annual 
benefits for workers electing to postpone receipt of pensions in years 
after normal retirement. This implicit zero reduction rate means a smaller 
value of incremental accrued benefits. The second factor involved in 
the drop in Z(a) after early retirement is the change in discounting of 
Pw(a) relative to Pw(a +  1).  This feature continues after normal re- 
tirement as well because benefits remain immediately available. Finally, 
beyond the normal retirement age there is a more rapid reduction in 
expected life span and, therefore, in the expected duration of benefit 
receipt if the worker postpones retiring. This feature also lowers Z(a) 
(see appendix). 
While these three features help explain low and even negative values 
of Z(a) after normal retirement, other provisions produce sharp declines 
in Z(a) at normal retirement. According to data in the 1979 BLS Level 
of Benefits Survey, 23% of covered workers are enrolled in plans that 
do not credit service at all after normal retirement. Another 30% of 
covered workers are in plans that provide limited credit after normal 
retirement,  and the remaining pension participants are in plans that 
credit all service during all years after normal retirement. Plans that 
provide limited credit typically credit service until the worker reaches 
a specified age, about age 70 on average. 
Once plans stop crediting service they either (1) commence benefit 
payments immediately regardless of the recipient’s work status, (2) defer 
pension benefits until the worker actually retires, or (3) defer payment 
until retirement, but actuarially increase the benefit. Of the participants 
in the plans that provide no or limited credit, 15% receive immediate 
payments, 76% receive deferred payments with no actuarial increase, 
and the rest receive deferred payments with an actuarial increase. 
10.1.2  Implication of Pension Accrual Discontinuities for Viewing 
Labor Market Equilibrium 
If  the labor market exhibits spot market equilibrium, Z(a) plus the 
worker’s nonpension compensation at age a, W(a),  equals the worker’s 
marginal product at age a, M(a): 
(2)  M(a) =  W(a)  + Z(a). 
Under the spot market assumption workers always receive M(a)  re- 
gardless of  the firm or its pension plan. If Z(a) is smaller in one firm 
than another, W(a)  must be larger in the firm with the smaller value of 
Z(a) to insure equality of total annual compensation across firms. Since 287  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
in a spot market equilibrium workers can freely move from one firm 
to another and firms can freely fire any worker demanding more than 
M(a),  only accrued vested benefits will have any economic value; if 
the value of this year’s pension benefits reflected anything other than 
those to which the worker had  legal title,  either the worker or the 
employer would have an incentive to terminate the employment rela- 
tionship. Note that the terms in (1) incorporate the spot market free 
mobility assumption in that workers are assumed to choose the most 
advantageous date to start collecting previously accumulated benefits 
since “retiring” for purposes of collecting a pension from one firm does 
not preclude subsequent work in another firm paying M(a). 
Obviously, if  W(a)  is a smooth function of  age, and Z(a) exhibits 
sharp discontinuities, M(a)  must exhibit sharp discontinuities at these 
same ages to satisfy (2). Casual empiricism suggests that W(a)  changes 
smoothly with age, or at least does not abruptly change precisely  at 
ages when  Z(a) exhibits  sharp changes.  There is  also no  reason  to 
believe that M(a)  abruptly changes with age to satisfy (2); hence the 
sizable discontinuities reported here in the I(a)  profile appear strikingly 
at odds with the spot market condition (2). 
10.1.3  Calculating Vested Benefit Accrual Profiles 
This study calculates accrual profiles for 2,342 of the 2,492 plans 
identified by the BLS as usable.’ Throughout the paper we focus on 
the age profiles of  the ratios of  Z(a) to W(a);  that is, we express the 
pension increments at age a as a fraction of the wage at age a. We 
utilize the survey’s weights in presenting various average accrual pro- 
files. The weights reflect the plan’s fraction of total pension partici- 
pants. To construct accrual profiles for plans which base their benefits 
on earnings we used a set of industry- and occupation-specific cross- 
section age earnings profiles estimated from CPS data. Longitudinal 
age earnings profiles were obtained by assuming 6% overall growth in 
wages and adding to this the wage growth by age estimated by the CPS 
cross section data. Kotlikoff and Wise (1984) describe these estimates 
in detail. In the analysis here we assume that wage earnings after age 
65 remain constant in nominal dollars. Our actuarial calculations em- 
ploy a 9% nominal interest rate and use a unisex mortality table, which 
represents an average of male and female mortality probabilities. Unlike 
the simple formulas in the appendix, our calculations take account of 
the worker’s survival probabilities before retirement as well as after. 
The BLS Level of Benefits Survey contains highly detailed informa- 
tion concerning the sampled pension plans’ vesting provisions, require- 
ments for early and normal retirement, the specifics of their normal and 
supplemental benefit formulas, and the crediting of service and payment 
of benefits for those working beyond the normal retirement age. 288  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
There is a very considerable amount of  diversity in the particular 
provisions of private plans which generate sizable differences in vested 
pension benefit accrual. Many seemingly minor features of a plan can 
have very important effects on benefit accrual. For example, consider 
a stipulation that service is credited for only 25 years in a plan that 
permits early retirement at 62. For a worker hired at age 30 the accrual 
at age 55 will decline sharply to zero and remain at zero until the early 
retirement age. Without this ceiling on credited service, accrual be- 
tween ages 55 and 62 could be very sizable; the weighted average ratio 
of  pension accrual to the wage is roughly 15% in our sample of plans 
with age 62 early retirement. Other examples of  very important “de- 
tails”  of pension provisions are age and service requirements for sup- 
plemental benefits, ceilings on the amount by  which social security 
benefits can be used  to offset pension  benefits, maximum values  of 
pension benefits, discontinuous changes by age in the rate of  benefit 
reduction for early retirement, and maximum ages for plan participa- 
tion. Each of these features, as well as numerous others not mentioned, 
can produce sharp discontinuities in I(a)  at ages other than the ages of 
vesting, early retirement, and normal retirement. Our calculations take 
into account each of the seemingly “minor” as well as major pension 
provisions included in the data. 
The considerable variation in plan features within industry and oc- 
cupation and, consequently, accrual profiles raises several important 
issues about the functioning of  the U.S. labor market. First, equally 
productive workers are likely to face very different incentives to change 
jobs or retire because of pension plans. Second, the heterogeneity  in 
accrual profiles across plans suggests that equally productive workers 
in the same industry and occupation, but  in  different plans, may be 
receiving  quite different amounts of  total compensation both on an 
annual and on a lifetime basis.  Third, equally productive workers of 
different sexes or ages who join the same pension plan in a firm at the 
same time are likely to receive very different labor remuneration, even 
if the quality and quantity of their labor supply is equivalent. Fourth, 
the complexity of the calculations required to compute the accrual of 
vested benefits, and therefore the compensation one is currently re- 
ceiving, calls into question the understanding of pension compensation 
both on the part of employers and workers. 
10.2  Pension Accrual Profiles for Percent-of-Earnings Plans 
Percent-of-earnings plans are discussed in this section and flat (non- 
earnings-related) plans in the next. Variation in pension accrual profiles 
by early and normal retirement ages is discussed first, followed by a 
discussion of the wide variation among plans holding early and normal 289  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
retirement ages fixed. Next we consider the effect of social security 
offset provisions and also examine accrual profiles by industry and by 
occupation. Then the effects of alternative post-normal retirement pro- 
vision are discussed. Finally there is an analysis of the effects on accrual 
profiles of early and normal retirement supplements. The cost in pen- 
sion wealth of job change is discussed in  section 10.4. Section 10.5 
describes the differences in the pension cost of hiring women versus 
men. 
10.2.1  The Decline in Pension Wealth Accrual at Early and Normal 
Retirement Ages 
Average accrual profiles for the percent-of-earnings  plans with  10- 
year cliff vesting are shown in table 10.1 by early and normal retirement 
ages. Three of these average profiles corresponding to plans with the 
respective early and normal retirement ages-55-55,  55-65, 65-65-are 
graphed in figure 10.1 In this and subsequent figures and tables, annual 
accrued pension  benefits are expressed as a ratio of the wage.  The 
graph depicts the very substantial declines in the rate of pension wealth 
accrual at several critical ages. The first is the age of normal retirement, 
which equals the age of  early retirement for plans with no early re- 
tirement option. Second, there is also a sharp decline in  the rate of 
accrual at the age of early retirement, but this decline is substantially 
lower than the decline at the normal retirement age.2  Third, there is a 
very substantial decline between ages 65 and 66 in the average accrual 
rate no matter what the ages of  early and normal retirement. 
The actual declines in average accrual rates at these critical ages 
indicated in table  10.1 are highlighted in table  10.2. The ages of early 
and normal retirement are identical in columns, 1, 4, 6, and 8 of the 
table with respective retirement ages of 55, 60, 62, and 65. At these 
ages the accrual rates as a percentage of wages decline from .26 to 0, 
.27 to -  .06, .25 to -  .13, and .21 to -  .19, respectively. Thus, at these 
ages the total annual compensation (wage plus pension accrual) from 
working declines by 21%, 26%, 30%, and 33% respectively. Surely then 
the incentive to continue work with the current employer past these 
ages is very substantially reduced. 
In instances where early and normal retirement ages do not coincide, 
there is also a very substantial decline in the ratio of pension accrual 
to the wage at the age of normal retirement. For example, among plans 
with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 60 the decline is 
from .14 to -  .09. There is also a decline at the age of early retirement 
for these plans, although it is considerably less substantial than the 
decline at the age of  normal retirement.  For example, of plans with 
early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65 the decline at 55 is 
from .10 to .07, while at 65 the decline is from .04 to -  .15. Table 10.1  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by 
Early and Normal Retirement Age 
Retirement Age (EarlyINormal) 
55/55  55160  55165  60160  60165  62/62  62165  65/65 





















































































































.043 53  ,204  .099  .072  .lo5  ,060  .I01  ,032  ,050 
54  ,231  ,113  ,083  .I17  ,068  .  I14  ,035  .055 
55  .261  .130  .097  .149  .082  .128  .039  ,065 
56  -  ,003  .I00  .068  .170  ,094  .I44  ,036  .068 
57  -  .012  .111  .072  .192  ,107  ,162  .039  ,076 
58  -  .020  .I18  ,076  .224  ,127  ,184  .044  ,089 
59  -  ,028  ,129  ,077  .241  ,146  ,208  .048  ,105 
60  -  .038  .143  ,079  269  .167  ,241  .054  ,118 
61  -  ,048  -  .090  .068  -  .061  ,133  ,220  .059  ,128 
62  -  ,058  -  .091  ,064  -  .091  .I15  .218  .066  ,145 
63  -  .067  -  .091  ,056  -.I14  .I14  -  .130  .017  ,163 
64  -  ,076  -  ,092  ,053  -  .I21  ,114  -  ,136  .012  ,186 
65  -  .085  -  .094  .044  -  .121  .1lZ  -  .144  .006  211 
66  -  .292  -  ,169  -  ,152  -  .I38  -  .088  -  ,266  -  .081  -  ,194 
67  -  ,294  -  ,174  -  ,162  -  ,155  -.115  -  .263  -  ,080  -  ,204 
68  -  ,295  -  ,179  -  .171  -  ,171  -  .142  -  ,260  -  .079  -  .213 
69  -  ,296  -  ,182  -  .179  -  .I84  -.162  -  .258  -  ,078  -  .221 
70  -  ,297  -  ,184  -  .186  -  ,196  -.I82  -  .255  -  .077  -  .234 
NOTE: Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 292  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 10.1  Weighted average accrual rates for percent-of-earnings plans 
with  10-year cliff vesting, for selected early and normal re- 
tirement ages. Plans with early or normal retirement supple- 
ments are excluded. 
Table 10.2 
Retirement Agc (EarlyINormal) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Age  55155  55160  55165  60160  60165  62162  62165  65/65 
40  ,244 
55  ,261 
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Finally, in all cases there is a substantial decline in the rate of pension 
accrual between ages 65 and 66. The effective reduction in compen- 
sation ranges from 8%  to 40% of the wage rate except for plans with 
early and normal retirement at 60, in which case the decline is from 
-  .I2  to -  .14. Thus while the stipulations of plans vary tremendously, 
these plans, on average, seem to provide a substantial inducement to 
retirement after age 65,  no matter what the inducement before this age. 
The figure and the table also show a large variation in average pension 
accrual at 40, the age of cliff vesting. It is highest, on average, for plans 
with early and normal retirement at 55 and lowest, on average, for plans 
with early and normal retirement at 65. As mentioned, because the 
early retirement reduction typically is less than actuarially fair, pension 
wealth is generally greatest if  benefits are taken at the age of early 
retirement. Thus the accrued wealth at the age of vesting is usually 
calculated by  discounting benefits from the age of  early retirement, 
assuming that the worker could begin to collect benefits at that age. 
Figure  10.1, for example,  shows a  vesting  spike of  almost  25%  of 
earnings for 55-55 plans, 7% of earnings for 55-65 plans, and about 4% 
of earnings for 65-65 plans. 
In summary, it seems apparent that continued participation in  the 
labor force after the age of normal retirement and sometimes even after 
the age of normal retirement typically involves a substantial reduction 
in compensation because of the very large declines in the rate of pension 
wealth accrual. After the age of 65, there is typically a substantial loss 
in pension accrual, no matter what the ages of  early and normal re- 
tirement. And, the sharp changes in average pension accrual at partic- 
ular ages provides rather strong prima facie evidence against annual 
spot market clearing; neither wages nor marginal products appear to 
adjust at these critical ages to meet the spot market equilibrium con- 
dition written in (I). 
10.2.2  Variation Among Plans 
Even among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages 
there is wide variation in accrual rates at each age, particularly  after 
the age of early retirement. To  demonstrate this fact, average accrual 
rates for the 513 plans of  table  10.1 with early retirement at 55 and 
normal retirement at 65, together with median, maximum, minimum, 
and upper and lower 5 percentile levels, are shown in table 10.3. The 
lower 5 percentile points for any age group for example is that accrual 
rate such that 5%  of plans have accruals below that level. The upper 
5 percentile point is defined analogously. Consider the accrual ratio at 
vesting.  While the average vesting ratio for this sample is  .071, the 
median is  ,021, the maximum is .383, and the minimum is zero. The 
ratio at the lowest fifth percentile is 0, while it is .201 for the largest 294  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.3  Dispersion of Accrual Ratios for Table 10.1 Plans with Age 55 
Early Retirement and Age 65  Normal Retirement (N = 513) 
Weighted 
Average  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Lowest  Largest 
Accrual  Accrual  Accrual  Accrual  Fifth  Fifth 
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fifth percentile. A similarly large dispersion in annual accrual ratios is 
indicated for each of the ages 40 through 70. Weighted average accrual 
rates together with upper and lower 5 percentile levels are graphed in 
figure 10.2. While the average accrual rates between ages 55 and 65 
are positive, for many plans the rates by 65 are very negative. Thus it 
is important to base judgment about the labor force participation in- 
centive effects of pension plans on more than average accrual rates. 
Additional evidence of the variability of pension accrued profiles is 
obtained by  comparing profiles of  particular plans. Figure 10.3 plots 
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Fig. 10.2  Weighted average accrual rates and upper and lower 5 per- 
centile levels for percent-of-earnings plans with 10-year cliff 
vesting, early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65. 




Fig. 10.3  Accrual profiles for four large plans. 296  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
exhibits a 29% vesting spike, a reduction of 30 percentage points in 
the accrual ratio at age 55 and a further major reduction at age 65 from 
-  .063 to -  .351. In contrast the vesting spike is only 4% for plan 2 in 
the figure. This plan also exhibits no major reduction in the accrual 
ratio at early retirement and only a minor reduction at normal retire- 
ment. Plan 3’s vesting spike is much less than that of plan  1, but the 
drop off of the accrual ratio at age 55 is very much larger than that in 
plan 1. This plan also exhibits extremely sharp changes in accrual ratios 
at ages 60 and 63. Plan 4 exhibits even greater discontinuities in the 
accrual profile. Thus the plans’ incentive effects on labor force partic- 
ipation also vary widely. 
10.2.3  The Effect of Social Security Offsets 
As described above, a substantial number of  plans have social se- 
curity offset provisions, under which pension benefits are reduced by 
an amount depending upon the recipients’ social security benefits. The 
offset provisions vary widely among plans. In some instances the offset 
is enough to completely eliminate payment of pension benefits from 
the private pension plan. Private pension benefit payments are typically 
substantially lower with than without the offset provision. Accrual rates 
for percent-of-earning plans with 10-year cliff vesting and early retire- 
ment at 55 are shown in table 10.4 for selected normal retirement ages, 
with and without social security offset provisions. The average profiles 
for offset and non-offset plans with early retirement at 55 and normal 
retirement  at 62 are graphed in figure  10.4. A noticeable difference 
between the two groups of plans is the relatively large spike at vesting 
for plans without the offset compared with the low rate of  accrual at 
vesting or plans with the social security offset. In addition, the accrual 
ratio at 55 is larger for plans without the offset than for plans with it, 
and the drop in  the rate of  accrual  is  substantially  larger for plans 
without  than  for plans  with  the offset.  The accrual ratio for plans 
without an offset is .21 at 55 and drops by almost 60% to .09 at 56. In 
contrast, the accrual rate for plans with an offset is about 16% at 55 
and drops by only about 26% to .12 at age 56. Both groups of plans 
show negative accrual rates after the age of normal retirement, 62, and 
both groups of plans show much larger negative accrual rates after 65. 
Table 5.4 indicates that the relative accrual rates of the two groups for 
plans with different normal retirement ages are similar to those shown 
in the figure. 
The table also shows that pension accrual at the age of vesting is 
rather substantial for plans without a social security offset even among 
plans with normal retirement at 65. The average accrual rate at vesting 
for all plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65 is 
.071, as shown in table  10.1 above. It can be seen in table 10.4 that Table 10.4  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings  Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting 
and Early Retirement at Age 55, by  Normal Retirement Age and Social Security Offset 
Normal Retirement Age 
55  62  65 
Without Offbet  With Offset  Without Offset  With Offset  Without Offset  With Offset 




















































































































.05  1 
,062 
.076 
,058 Table 10.4  (continued) 
Normal Retirement Age 
55  62  65 
Without Offset  With Offset  Without Offset  With Offset  Without Offset  With Offset 















-  .016 
-  .025 
-  ,034 
~  ,043 
-  .052 
~  ,062 
~  ,071 
-  .081 
-  .090 
-  .309 
-  ,309 
-  ,308 
-  ,307 





-  ,004 
~  ,012 
-  .024 
-  ,026 
-  .032 
-  ,109 
-  ,132 
-  ,153 
-  ,172 







-  .075 
-  ,086 
-  .098 
-  ,224 
-  ,248 
-  ,270 
-  ,280 
-  ,290 
.I20 
,135 




-  ,066 
-  ,069 
-  .074 
-.I54 
-  ,170 
-.1x4 
-  ,196 
-  .204 










-  ,203 
~  ,212 
~  ,219 
-  .227 










~  .097 
-  .I08 
-.119 
-.128 
-  ,136 
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AGE 
Fig. 10.4  Weighted average accrual rates for percent-of-earnings plans 
with  10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55 and normal 
retirement at 62, for plans with and without social security 
offsets.  (Note: Plans with early or normal  retirement sup- 
plements are excluded.) 
the accrual is over 12% for plans without a social security offset while 
it is less than 2%  for plans with an offset. 
10.2.4  Accrual Ratios by Industry and Occupation 
Industry 
Accrual profiles for selected industries are shown in table 10.5. For 
purposes of  comparison and for ease of  exposition, profiles are pre- 
sented only for plans with early retirement at 55, although profiles for 
three normal retirement ages, 55, 62, and 65, are shown. The most 
apparent difference among industries is in the proportion of plans with 
particular early and normal retirement ages. For example, in retail trade 
and services almost all plans have normal retirement at 65; only a few 
plans have early retirement at 55 or 62. On the other hand, almost 62% 
of plans in transportation have early and normal retirement at 55; ap- 
proximately 20% of plans show normal retirement at 62 and 20% at 65. 
In manufacturing, 66% of plans have normal retirement at 65, 28% at 
62, and about 6% at 55. 
But among plans with the same early and normal retirement age, 
table 5.5  indicates little difference in average accrual profiles across 
industries. Table 10.6 isolates accrual ratios at critical ages, in particular 300  Laurence J. Kutlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.5  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10- 
Year Cliff Vesting and Early  Retirement at 55, by  Industry and Normal 
Retirement Age 
~~ 
Manufacturing  Transportation 
5Sl55  55/62  55/65  5Sl55  55/62  55165 













































.  I87 
,211 
.240 
-  .008 
-  ,178 
-  .025 
-  ,035 
-  .046 
-  ,057 
-  .068 
-  ,079 
-  .088 
-  .ow 
-  ,288 
-  ,288 
-  .288 
-  .288 























-  ,080 
-  ,087 
-  .095 
-  ,158 
-  ,174 
-  ,189 
-  ,204 
-  ,216 



























-  ,141 
-  ,152 
-  ,161 


















-  .003 
-  ,011 
-  ,019 
-  ,028 
-  .036 
-  ,045 
-  ,054 
-  ,062 
-  ,071 
-  .080 
-  .300 
-  .301 
-  ,302 
-  ,302 
























-  .077 
-  ,085 
-  .094 
-  ,242 
-  ,276 
-  ,309 
-  ,320 



























-  .206 
-  .217 
-  .227 
-  ,237 
-  ,246 
NOTE:  Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 
before and after the age of early retirement and before and after the 
age of  normal retirement. Averages are only presented for cells with 
more than 10  plans. Two dashes indicate that there were fewer than 
10. The cell was left blank if  the corresponding age did not represent 
a critical age for the plan in question. Only in manufacturing and trans- 
portation were there a substantial number of plans with early and nor- 
mal retirement at 55. In these two industries, the accrual profiles look 
very similar. Three industries had a significant number of plans with 301  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
Retail Trade  Finance  Services 
55/55  55/62  55/65  55/55  55/62  55/65  55/55  55/62  55/65 

















-  ,182 
-  .176 
-  ,171 
-  ,167 
-  ,164 
-  ,161 
-  ,159 
-  ,158 
-  ,159 
-  .lo6 
-  ,040 
-  .044 
-  ,048 
-  ,045 
























-  ,040 
-  .054 
-  .068 
-  .160 
-  ,158 
-.157 
-.I58 
























-  ,017 
-  ,027 
-  .059 
-  .I56 
-  ,158 
-  ,160 
-  ,161 






















-  ,052 
-  .065 
-  ,078 
-  ,088 
-  .099 
-.150 
-  ,206 
-  ,256 
-  ,300 























-  ,093 
-  .I00 
-  .lo8 
-  ,187 
-  ,214 
-  ,238 
-  .245 






























-  .192 
-  ,207 

















-  ,010 
-  ,018 
-  ,027 
-  ,035 
-  .045 
-  .053 
-  ,062 
-  ,072 
-  ,081 
-  .090 
-  ,316 
-.311 
-  ,807 
-  ,302 
























-  ,075 
-  ,086 
-  .096 
-  .406 
-  ,400 
-  ,395 
-  .390 



























-  .I44 
-  ,152 
p.158 
-  ,164 
-  .I69 
early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 62, and again there 
seems to be little noticeable difference among the plans by industry. 
All industries have plans with normal retirement at 65. but even in this 
case, the profiles seem quite similar. The only possible exception seems 
to be retail trade, where pension accrual relative to the wage rate is 
less generous than in the other industry groups. 
Nonetheless, a typical worker apparently faces a much greater in- 
centive to leave the labor force early in some industries than in others. 302  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.6  Weighted Average Accrual Rates at Selected Ages for Percent-of- 
Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting Early Retirement at 55, 
Early and Normal Retirement Ages and Industry 
Early/  Industry 
Normal 
Retirement  Retail 






























-  .008 
-  ,099 
-  .288 





-  .080 
-  ,095 
-  .158 





-  .141 
-  .177 
,257 
,269 
-  ,003 
-  ,080 
-  ,300 





-  .077 
-  .097 
-  .242 
-  ,329 




-  .206 











-  ,093 
-  ,108 
-  ,187 






-  222 
For example, a large portion of workers covered by pensions in trans- 
portation would experience a 27%  reduction in effective compensation 
by continuing to work between 55 and 56. Whereas at age 55 pension 
accrual would be  equivalent  to about  27% of  wage rates for many 
workers in this industry, if the worker continued in the labor force until 
age 66, his annual loss in pension wealth would be equivalent to 30% 
of wage earnings at 66. A large proportion of workers in manufacturing 
have plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65. In 
this case, the accrual at 55 averages about 9% of the wage at 55 and 
declines only to about 7% of the wage by 65. But then the accrual rate 
becomes negative, and if the worker were to continue in the labor force 303  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
between 65 and 66, the decline in pension accrual would amount to an 
effective reduction in compensation of about 21%. 
Occupation 
Among plans with the same early and normal retirement ages, the 
pension accrual ratios do not differ noticeably by occupation. Accrual 
ratios for professions, clerical workers, and production workers are 
shown in table 10.7 for plans with early retirement at age 55 and three 
normal retirement ages-55,  62, and 65. Plans in  the 55-65 group are 
graphed by occupation in figure 10.5. It seems clear from the table and 
the figure that given the age of normal retirement, there appear to be 
no substantial differences in accrual ratios by occupational group. Con- 
sider, for example, plans with normal retirement at age 55: at age 55, 
the accrual ratio is .29 for professionals, .25 for clerical workers, and 
.25 for production workers. At age 66, the accrual ratio has dropped 
to -  .30 for professionals, -  .30 for clerical  workers,  and -  .29 for 
production workers. Similarly, close ratios are observed for the other 
two normal retirement ages. For example, at age 62 the accrual ratios 
for plans with normal retirement at 62 are .10 for professionals, .10 for 
clerical workers, and .I0 for production workers.  This is not to say 
that there are no differences in pension coverage by occupational groups. 
It simply says that conditional on having a plan with given early and 
normal retirement ages, the accrual ratios for the occupational groups 
are very similar. The data in table 10.7 may, however, be concealing 
intra-industry variation in accrual profiles by occupation for given re- 
tirement ages. 
To address this potential ambiguity, accrual ratios for the same plans 
treated in table 10.7 are presented in table 10.8 but only for manufac- 
turing.  But here  again there is  very  little  difference  in  the accrual 
profiles by occupation. Consider, for example, the drop in accrual ratios 
between ages 55 and 66. For plans with normal retirement at age 55, 
the decline is .58 (.287 minus -  .295) for professionals, .51 for clerical 
workers, and SO  for production workers. Analogous declines are .29 
for professionals, .30 for clerical workers, and .35 for production work- 
ers, respectively, in plans with normal retirement at 62. Only among 
plans with normal retirement at age 65 is there a noticeable difference 
in the accrual ratios by occupation. In this case, the drop between age 
55  and age 66  is  .29 for professionals,  .25 for clerical workers, but 
somewhat less than .I8  for production workers. Thus we conclude that 
differences in pension accrual ratios by occupation are primarily due 
to different plan types or to differences in early and normal retirement, 
given the general type of  plan. Production workers, for example, are 
more likely to have flat benefit plans than professionals. Table 10.7  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement 
at Age 55, by Normal Retirement Age and Occupation 
Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Age  = 55  Age  = 62  Age  = 65 
Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof. 
Age  (N = 53)  (N = 51)  (N  = 48)  (N = 75)  (N  = 74)  (N = 38)  (N = 204) 
Cler.  Prod. 

































































































,077  .062 
,014  ,011 
,017  ,013 
.019  .016 
.022  ,018 
,028  ,022 
.033  ,025 
.036  ,028 
,042  .033 
.048  .037 
.055  ,041 


























-  ,001 
-  ,010 
-  ,019 
-  .027 
-  ,036 
-  ,042 
-  .049 
-  ,295 
-  .298 
-  .303 
-  ,306 





-  .025 
-  ,036 
-  .046 
-  ,058 
-  .070 
-  ,087 
-  .lo1 
-.114 
-  .128 
-  .140 
-  ,295 
-  ,298 
-  .300 
-  ,302 





-  ,005 
-  ,012 
-  ,020 
-  ,027 
-  ,035 
-  ,044 
-  .052 
-  .060 
-  .068 
-  ,075 
-  ,290 
-  ,289 
-  .288 
-  .287 
-  ,286 
,116  ,128 
.132  .I47 
,155  ,166 
.177  .191 
,102  ,113 
,106  ,115 
,116  .I27 
,119  ,126 
,118  ,121 
,103  ,098 
.loo  .098 
-  ,069  -  ,077 
-  .074  -  ,087 
-  .080  -  .09X 
-  ,171  -  .203 
-  ,185  -  ,223 
-  ,199  -  ,242 
-  .206  ~  ,252 












-  ,068 
-  ,074 
-  .083 
-  .199 
-  .224 
-  .247 
-  .260 













.os  1 
.038 
-  ,167 
-  ,175 
-  .I84 
-  ,193 















-  .157 
-  .169 
-  ,180 
-  .I90 
















-  .I43 
-  .I49 
-.156 
-  ,160 
NOTE:  Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. 306  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 10.5  Weighted average accrual rates for percent-of-earnings plans 
with 10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55 and normal 
retirement at 65, by occupation. (Note: Plans with early or 
normal retirement  supplements are excluded.) 
10.2.5  The Effect of Alternative Post-Normal  Retirement 
Provisions on Pension Accrual 
Accrual ratios for percent-of-earnings plans with early retirement at 
55 are shown in table 10.9 for selected normal retirement ages and for 
alternative post-normal  retirement  provisions.  The post-normal  re- 
tirement provisions have been grouped into five categories: 
1. Full credit, deferred: Plans providing full credit according to the 
standard formula for years worked past the age of normal retire- 
ment, but with benefits beginning only after retirement. 
2. No credit, deferred: Plans with no credit given for work after the 
the age of  normal retirement  and with benefits beginning only 
after retirement. 
3.  No credit, immediate payout or actuarial increase: Plans with no 
credit given for additional work after the age of normal retirement, 
but with benefits beginning immediately or increased actuarially 
until benefits are taken. 
4. Limited credit, deferred: Plans with limited credit given for work 
after the age of normal retirement or with full credit for service 
post normal retirement up to a specified age or number of years; 
benefits are deferred in these plans until retirement. 
5. Limited  credit, immediate payout or actuarial increase: Plans 
with provisions  analogous to the third category above but with 
limited credit rather than no credit. Table 10.8  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early 
Retirement at Age 55, by  Normal Retirement Age and Occupation, for Manufacturing 
~ 
Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Age :  55  Age  = 62  Age  = 65 
Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof.  Cler.  Prod. 










































































































































































,055 Table 10.8  (continued) 
Normal Retirement  Normal  Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Age  = 55  Age = 65  Age  = 62 
Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof.  Cler.  Prod.  Prof.  Cler.  Prod. 
Age  (N  = 9)  (N  = 7)  (N  = 6)  (N  = 44)  (N  = 45)  (N = 18)  (N  = 101)  (N  = 99)  (N  = 56) 
57  -  .oox  -  ,006  -  .027  ,088  .I20  .093  .087  ,084  ,057 
58  -  ,015  -  ,012  -  ,034  .093  .128  .093  .093  .095  .0h2 
59  -  .027  -  .020  -  .044  .095  .I27  .087  ,093  ,102  ,064 
60  -  ,039  -  .028  -  .055  ,094  .126  .077  ,091  ,107  ,068 
61  -  .05 1  -  .036  -  ,066  ,092  ,126  ,076  .080  ,101  ,059 
62  -  ,062  -  ,045  -  .077  .097  .139  A72  .077  ,099  .0h1 
63  -  ,076  -  ,053  -  .089  -  ,084  -  ,047  -  .lo4  .070  ,101  ,057 
64  -  .081  -  .062  -  .  100  -  ,088  -  .053  -.113  ,064  ,098  ,059 
65  -  .092  -  .070  -  A11  -  .094  -  .061  -  .I24  .057  .095  .U60 
66  -  ,295  -  ,280  -  ,286  -  .  142  -  ,148  -  .I76  -  ,176  -  ,151  -.114 
67  -  ,304  -  ,276  -  ,282  -.151  -  ,176  -  .I98  -  ,182  -  .I66  -  ,127 
68  -  .314  ~  ,272  -  ,278  -  .161  -  .  193  -  .217  -  ,194  -  ,179  -.133 
69  -  ,323  -  ,270  -  ,273  -.171  -  .21  I  -  ,235  -  .203  -  .189  -  .  141 
70  -  ,329  -  .268  -  ,270  -  .  179  -  ,224  -  ,250  -  ,212  -  ,198  -  ,146 
NOIE: Plans with carly or normal retirement supplements are excluded. Table 10.9  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement 
at 55, by Normal Retirement Age and Post-Normal Retirement Provision 
Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Age = 55  Age  = 62 
Limited 
No Credit,  Credit. 
Immed.  Immed. 
Full  No  Limited  Full  No  Payout or  Limiled  Payout or 
Credit,  Credit,  Credit,  Credit,  Credit,  Actuarial  Credit,  Actuarial 
Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Increase  Defer.  Increase 
Age  (N  = 18)  (N = 5)  (N  = 129)  (N  = 76)  (N = 7)  (N  = 2)  (N  = 66)  (N  = 35) 
Normal Rctirement 
Age = 65 
No  Limited 
Credit,  Credit, 
Immed.  Immed. 
Full  No  Payout or  Limited  Payout or 
Credit,  Credit,  Actuarial  Credit,  Actuarial 
Defer.  Defer.  Increase  Defer.  Increase 
(N  = 212)  (N  = 207)  (N = 63)  (N  = 22)  (N = 9) 
40  .186 
41  ,035 
42  ,040 
43  ,045 
44  ,051 
45  ,058 
46  ,072 
47  .OX5 
48  ,096 
49  ,110 
50  ,125 
51  .I43 
52  .I66 
53  .I88 
54  .214 
5s  .244 
































.23  I 
.261 
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,112 Table 10.9  (continued) 
Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Age = S5  Age = 62 
No Credit, 
Immed. 
Full  No  Limited  Full  No  Payout or  Limited 
Credit,  Credit.  Credit,  Credit,  Ci-edit,  Actuarial  Credit, 
Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Defer.  Increase  Defer. 
Age  (N =  18)  (N = 5)  (N =  129)  (N = 76)  (N = 7)  (N = 2)  (N  = 66) 
Normal  Retirement 







Immed.  Immed.  Immed. 
Payout or  Full  No  Payout or  Limited  Payout or 
Actuarial  Credit.  Credit,  Actuarial  Credit,  Actuarial 
Increase  Defer.  Defer.  Increase  Defer.  Increaqe 

















-  .w7 
-  ,017 
-  ,039 
-  ,048 
-  ,058 
-  .063 
-  ,071 
.I13 
-.I15 
-  .I96 
-  ,236 
-  ,272 
-.077  -.016 
-.a75  -.024 
-.073  -.a33 
-  ,071  -.(I42 
-.070  -.a51 
-.069  -.060 
-.068  -.069 
-.079  -.078 
-.016  -.OX7 
-.018  -.317 
-.020  -.3l2 
-.021  -.308 
p.020  -.303 







-  ,064 
-  ,074 
-  ,085 
-  ,166 
-  .208 
-  ,247 
-  ,268 





,158  - 
.216  - 
-  ,378 
-  ,357 
~  ,337 
-.318 
~  ,314 
-  ,309 
-  ,304 





















-  ,033 
-  ,037 
-  ,045 
-  ,026 
-  ,260 
-  ,257 
-  ,256 




.  I06 
,073 
.a66 
-  ,051 
-  ,063 
















-  .  I94 
-  -21  I 











-  ,179 
-  ,177 


























-  .  165 
-  ,175 
-.I85 
-  ,201 
-  ,210 
,116 
.  I28 
127 







-  ,148 
-. 179 
-  ,207 
-  ,230 
NOTE:  Men only. There were no plans with the provisions corresponding to the two deleted categories under the 55 normal retircment heading 311  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
With the exception of plans of  type 3, these provisions typically lead 
to very negative accrual ratios after the age of normal retirement. Table 
10.9 compares accrual ratios across these five types of plans with vary- 
ing post-normal  retirement benefit provisions. The table examines al- 
ternative normal retirement ages, with early retirement occurring at 
55. The figures in table 10.9 are somewhat surprising, indicating quite 
negative accrual ratios for plans that fully credit post-normal retirement 
service; indeed, in certain cases, these negative accrual ratios are larger 
in absolute value than negative accrual ratios of plans that provide no 
credit. 
To  isolate  the impact of the choice of  post-retirement provisions, 
accrual ratios for percent-of-earnings plans with early retirement at 55 
and selected normal retirement ages were calculated first assuming that 
all of the plans had a full credit provision and second assuming that all 
of the plans had a no-credit provision. These results are shown in table 
10.10. The table indicates that the effect of crediting service after nor- 
mal retirement depends importantly on the age of normal retirement. 
For plans with a normal retirement age of  55, negative accrual ratios 
are larger in absolute value  under  no crediting prior to age 66  and 
smaller in absolute value thereafter. 
10.2.6 
Approximately  11.4% of  plans  have early  and 7.5% have  normal 
retirement supplements. The typical normal retirement supplement pro- 
vides an addition to otherwise calculated benefits if the individual post- 
pones  retirement until the  normal retirement age. The typical  early 
retirement supplement provides an addition to benefits if  retirement 
occurs after the age of early retirement. The average accrual rates for 
percent-of-earnings and flat plans with supplements and with  I0-year 
cliff vesting and early and normal retirement at 55 and 65, respectively, 
are shown in table 10.11 by type of  supplement. There are only two 
plans in  the category with only normal retirement  supplements, but 
nonetheless the effect of the supplements can be seen in the first column 
of the table. The accrual rate jumps from about 8% of the wage at age 
64  to 60%  of  the wage at  age 65. Thus  the  supplement apparently 
provides a relatively strong incentive to remain with the firm until age 
65, but thereafter there is a sharp drop in the accrual rate to -  18%. 
Accrual rates for plans with early retirement supplements are shown 
in the second column of the table. In this case there is a sharp increase 
in  the accrual rate from .I2 at age 54 to .44 at age 44, with a sharp 
drop thereafter. Again, the provision  seems to provide a substantial 
incentive to remain with the firm to the age of  early retirement, with 
a very substantial decline thereafter. Accrual rates for plans with both 
types of supplement are shown in the last column of the table. In this 
Early and Normal Retirement Supplements 312  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.10  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 
10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early Retirement at 55, by Normal Retirement 
Age, Assuming Full-Credit and No-Credit Post-Retirement Provisions 
Normal 
Ret. 
Assumed  Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement  Normal Retirement 
Post- 
Normal 
Ret.  Full  No  Full  No  Full  No 
Provision  Credit  Credit  Credit  Credit  Credit  Credit 
Age  = 55  Age  = 62  Age  = 65 
















































-  ,002 
-  ,011 
-  ,019 
-  ,027 
-  ,037 
-  .049 
-  ,059 
-  ,068 
-  ,077 
-  .086 
-  ,133 
-  ,177 
-  .219 
-  ,261 

















-  ,244 
-  .229 
-  ,215 
-  .202 
-  .I39 
-  ,178 
-  .I67 
-  ,157 
-  ,148 
-  .139 
-  .I30 
-.I28 
-.I27 
-  ,124 
























-  ,060 
-  ,069 
-  .079 
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-  ,216 
-.212 
case there is a rather large spike at the age of early retirement, equal 
to 62% of the wage in that year, with a smaller but still noticeable spike 
at about the age of  normal retirement. 
Accrual  rates  for  percent-of-earnings  and  flat  plans  with  either 
type  of  supplement  are  shown  in  table  10.12  for  selected  early 
and  normal  retirement  ages.  The  spikes  in  the  accrual  rates  are 313  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
Table 10.11  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings  and Flat 
Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, Early and Normal Retirement at 
55-65,  and Early or Normal Retirement Supplement, by  Type 
of Supplement 
Type of  Supplement 
NorFal 
(N = 2) 
Early 
(N = 10) 
Both 
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-  ,008 
-  ,014 
-  ,022 
-  ,011 
-  ,049 
-  ,058 
-  ,073 
-  ,022 
-  .031 
-  ,247 
-  ,213 
-  .207 
-  ,204 

















-  ,051 
-  .049 
-  .043 
-  ,046 
~  ,051 
-  ,068 
-  ,072 
-  .080 
.009 
.008 
-  .092 
-  .167 
-  ,164 
~.  163 
-  .I60 
highlighted  with  dashed  lines.  Consider,  for  example,  plans  with 
early  retirement  at  age  55.  The  spike  created  by  the  early  re- 
tirement  supplement  is  from  .22  to  .39 for plans  with  normal  re- 
tirement  at  55, from  .I2 to  SO  for  plans  with  normal  retirement 
at  60,  and  from  .ll to  .48  for  plans  with  normal  retirement  at 
65. Of  the 56  plans  with  normal retirement  at age 60,  the pension 
accrual rate  at that  age  is  on average  equivalent  to  100% of  the 
wage  rate.  Similar discontinuities  in  the accrual  ratios  are evident 314  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 1O.U  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings and Flat 
Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting and Early or Normal Retirement 
Supplements,  by Early and Normal Retirement  Ages 
55155  55160  55165  60160  60165  62/62 
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-  ,085 
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-  ,079 
-  ,086 
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-.141 
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.018 
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NOTE: There are no plans in the 62-65  or in the 65-65  early-normal retirement groups. 
for  plans  with  other  early  and  normal  retirement  ages.  For  ex- 
ample,  of  plans  with  early  and  normal  retirement  at  age  60,  the 
accrual rate  at that  age  is  equivalent to 64%  of  the  annual wage 
for  persons  aged  60.  Thus these  special  supplements create  very 
significant one-time  additions to pension wealth  and therefore pro- 
vide  potentially  very important incentives  to remain with  the firm 
until  the  age  at  which  the  special  supplement  is  awarded.  The 
special  supplements  also  further  dramatize  the  wide  variation  in 
the  incentive  effects  implicit  in  the  provisions  of  private  pension 
plans. 315  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
10.3  Flat Benefit Plans 
Accrual ratios for flat benefit plans with selected early and normal 
retirement are shown in table  10.13. This table can be compared to 
table 10.1 above, which presents comparable numbers for percent-of- 
earnings plans. The accrual profiles for flat plans  with early-normal 
retirement at age 55-55,  55-60,  55-65  are shown graphically in figure 
10.6.  In general, the accrual profiles for the flat benefit plans look quite 
similar to those for percent-of-earnings plans. Recall that we have as- 
sumed that the flat benefit increases with the rate of inflation, assumed 
to be 6%  annually in our calculations. While it is not possible to make 
comparisons for plans with each of  the early and normal retirement 
combinations because of the relatively small sample sizes in some of 
them  for flat benefit plans,  for several early-normal  retirement  age 
combinations there are rather large numbers of plans of both types, 
for example, the combinations 55-60,  55-65,  and 60-65.  The average 
decline in the accrual ratio between the age of early retirement to age 
66 is .30  for percent-of-earnings plans versus .39  for flat benefits plans 
in the case of the 55-60  retirement age combination. It is .25  versus .16 
for the 55-65  combination, and .26  versus .17  for the 60-65  combination. 
Accrual ratios at several critical ages for plans with early retirement 
at 55  and  normal retirement at  65 are shown below for percent-of- 
earnings and flat benefit plans. 
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-  .091 
-  .lo2 
The accrual rates for these plans are graphed in figure 10.7. The evi- 
dence seems to indicate that the two types of plan provide rather similar 
incentive effects. 
The provisions  of flat rate plans, like those of percent-of-earnings 
plans, also yield widely different ratios, even among plans with the 
same early and normal retirement ages. Indications of  the dispersion 
of the accrual ratios among flat plans with early and normal retirement 
at 55  and 65,  respectively, are shown in table 10.14 and in figure 10.8. 
While the average accrual rate at age 55, for example, is 7% the min- 
imum value is zero and the maximum is 24%. Similarly at age 56,  while 
the average is about 5%  the maximum is 20%  and the minimum about Table 10.13  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Flat-Rate Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by  Early and 
Normal Retirement Age 
55/55  55/60  55/65  60/60  60165  62/62  62/65  65/65 
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Fig. 10.6  Weighted average accrual rates for flat rate plans  with  10- 
year cliff vesting, for selected early and normal retirement 
ages. (Note: Plans with early or normal retirement  supple- 
ments are excluded.) 318  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.14  Dispersion of Accrual Rates for Table 10.11 Plans with Age 55 
Early Retirement and Age 65 Normal Retirement (N = 106) 
Weighted 
Average  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Lowest  Largest 
Accrual  Accrual  Accrual  Accrual  Fifth  Fifth 
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-  ,006 
-  ,007 
-  .010 
~  ,013 
-  ,031 
~  ,217 
-  .213 
-  ,209 
-  ,204 
-  .198 
-  ,560 
-  ,552 
-  ,545 
-  ,536 
-  .528 
.260  0 
.045  0 
,050  0 
,057  0 
,064  0 
.072  0 
,081  0 
,091  0 
,102  0 
,115  0 
,130  0 
.I47  0 
.166  0 
,187  0 
,212  0 
.240  .006 
,195  0 
,192  0 
,189  0 
,183  -  ,008 
.I84  -  .024 
,204  ~  ,051 
.226  -  ,066 
.400  -  .082 
.561  ~  .093 
.328  -  .lo1 
0  -  ,275 
,008  -  .291 
,055  -  .287 
,045  ~  .283 
































zero. At 65, the average is 5%  with a maximum of almost 33% and a 
minimum of about -20%.  At 66, after the age of normal retirement, 
the average accrual rate is  -9%  while the minimum is -56%  and the 
maximum is zero. Thus the incentive for retirement varies widely among 
flat as well as among percent-of-earnings plans. 
10.4  The Pension Cost of Job Change 
There are many ways to think  about the effect  of  job change on 
pension accrual and the potential incentive effects of pension provisions 319  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
2o t 
I-  6 -10 
5 
a  -t  -20 
-50b  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
AGE 
34  36  38  40  42  44  46  48  50  52  54  56  58  60  62  64  66  68  70 
Fig. 10.8  Weighted average accrual rates and upper and lower 5 per- 
centile levels for flat rate plans with  10-year cliff vesting, 
early retirement at 55, and normal retirement at 65. (Note: 
Plans  with  early  or  normal  retirement  supplements  are 
excluded.) 
on the job change decision. One approach is to consider the effect of 
job change on accrued pension wealth at the age of retirement, say the 
age of plan-normal retirement. Another way is to consider the expected 
loss in future pension  wealth  from changing job as a proportion of 
expected future wages. We  shall consider variations of both measures. 
10.4.1 
Consider a person who starts a job at some age, say 31. Suppose 
that at a given subsequent age the person could change to another job 
and obtain the same future wages as on the current job. Assume that 
his decision is either to stay on the current job until normal retirement 
or to switch to the second job and stay on that one until the age of 
normal retirement. But suppose that the new job has no pension. Then 
the loss in pension wealth is equal to the pension wealth that the worker 
would accrue if  he were to stay with the current employer until the 
age of  normal retirement.  This loss relative  to the present value  of 
expected future wages is shown in tables 10.15, 10.16, and 10.17. Table 
10.15 assumes that an individual begins employment with the first firm 
at age 31. Table 10.16 assumes a starting age of 41, and table 10.17 a 
starting age of  51. The tables present these loss ratios by plan-normal 
retirement age, and loss ratios are calculated through the age of normal 
retirement. To  obtain a more concise picture of the losses, they are 
If  Change to a No-Pension Job 320  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.15  Loss in Expected Pension Wealth If Change to No-Pension Job, as 
Percent of Expected Wages, by Age of Job Change and by Normal 
Retirement Age, Starting Initial Job at Age 31 
Age at Normal Retirement 
55  60  62  65 


























































































































































shown for selected ages of job change in table  10.18. For plans with 
normal retirement  at age 65,  the  loss  in pension  wealth  relative  to 
expected wages is relatively small, between 4%  and 6% for all ages of 
job change, with the exception of job change at age 59 when joining 
the firm at age 5 1. In the latter case, the remaining working life of the 
individual is short and he is not yet vested. Thus the loss in potential 
pension accrual is relatively large compared to future earnings. Among 321  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
Table 10.16  Loss in Expected Pension Wealth If Change to  No-Pension Job, as 
Percent of Expected Wages, by Age of Job Change and by Normal 
Retirement Age, Starting Initial Job at Age 41 
Age at Normal Retirement 
55  60  62  65 







































































































.03  1 
plans with earlier normal retirement-55,  60, or 62-the  potential loss 
in future pension accrual is considerably larger, typically on the order 
of 8966-20%  of future earnings. The loss if one changes jobs  just before 
normal retirement, however, is in some instances much larger than this, 
as high as 3096650%. For example, if at age 31 one enters a plan with 
normal retirement at age 60, the loss ratio if  one changes job at 59 is 
31%. If the individual enters at 51 and leaves at 59, the loss is almost 
50%. 
The greater relative loss with earlier normal retirement is shown in 
figure 10.9, which presents loss ratios versus age for normal retirement 
at 55 and at 65, starting at age 31. The effect of starting age is shown 
graphically in figure 10.10 for plans with normal retirement at 60. 
A limiting case of numbers like those presented in table 10.18 is the 
present discounted value of expected pension benefits at the age of hire 
as a proportion of expected wages at that time. These numbers of course 322  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
Table 10.17  Loss in Expected Pension Wealth If  Change to No-Pension Job, as 
Percent of Expected Wages, by Age of  Job Change and by Normal 
Retirement Age, Starting initial Job at Age 51 
Age at Normal Retirement 
55  60  62  65 
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Table 10.18  Loss in Expected Pension Wealth If Change to No-Pension Job, as 
Percent of Expected Wages by Age of Job Change, Age of  Starting 
Job, and Age of Normal Retirement 
Starting Age 
and 
Age  55  60  62  65 























































NOTE:  With expectations evaluated to plan normal retirement  age. 323  The Incentive Effects of  Private Pension Plans 
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Fig. 10.9  Loss in expected pension wealth if change to no-pension job, 
as a percentage of expected wages, for normal retirement at 
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Fig. 10.10  Loss in expected pension wealth if change to no-pension job, 
as a percentage of expected wages, for normal retirement at 
60, by age started job. 324  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
indicate the cost to the employer of pension benefits versus wages if 
a person stays with the employer from the time of hire to the age of 
early or normal retirement. Such ratios are presented in table 10.19 by 
age of initial employment and plan-normal retirement age. The ratios 
are presented first assuming that the individual remains with the firm 
until the age of early retirement and then assuming that the person 
remains until the age of normal retirement. It can be seen from the 
table that the present discounted value of pension versus wage com- 
pensation is small on average, ranging from about 2%  to about 10%. 
The average proportion of compensation in pension benefits is typically 
larger the later the age of initial employment. For example, the ratio 
of pension benefits to wages for plans with normal retirement at 62 is 
.049 if one enters the firm at 31 and stays  to the age of normal retirement. 
The ratio is .062 if  one enters at 41, and .094 if  one enters at 51. It is 
important to understand that while these ratios may appear relatively 
small, the pattern of pension accrual may still have a very substantial 
effect on worker labor force participation,  as demonstrated above. 
Possibly the most striking feature of  these loss ratios is the wide 
variation among plans. To demonstrate the dispersion, the mean loss 
ratio and the minimum and maximum at each age are shown in table 
Table 10.19  Present Discounted Value of Expected Pension Benefits as a 
Proportion of Expected Wages, at Age of Hire, by Age of Hire 
and Plan Normal Retirement Age 
Age of  Hire and 
Plan Normal 
Retirement Age 
If Retire at 
Early 
Retirement Age 


















































- 325  The Incentive Effects of  Private Pension Plans 
10.20 for plans with normal retirement at 65 and for persons who enter 
the firm at age 3 1. Up to age 55-which  is the age of early retirement 
for a substantial proportion of plans-the  loss is close to zero for some 
plans and indeed is even negative for some. For other plans, however, 
the loss is very high, ranging up to 26% of future earnings at age 54. 
After 55, the maximum loss is typically over 30%, while the minimum 
is close to  -20%  at each age. Pension accrual after the age of  early 
retirement is negative in many instances. For a member of such a plan, 
Table 10.20  Dispersion of Loss in Expected Pension Wealth If Change to No- 
Pension Job, for Plans in Table 10.15 with Normal Retirement at 
Age 65 
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it would pay to leave this firm, taking early retirement benefits, and 
join another firm, assuming that one could join the second firm and 
obtain the same expected future wages. 
10.4.2  Job Change and Pension Wealth at Age of 
Normal Retirement 
Pension wealth at the age of normal retirement may be reduced very 
substantially by job change, as shown in table  10.21. A person who 
began work at 3  1 and changed to another  job at 41 would have accrued, 
on average, only 72% of the pension wealth of a person who began at 
31 and remained in the same firm. If  he changed jobs at 41 and again 
at 51, he would accrue only 43% of the pension wealth of  a person 
with no job change. This percentage ranges from a low of  30%  on 
average in transportation to 60% in construction. Thus the loss in pen- 
sion wealth with job change seems to provide a potentially  large in- 
centive against job mobility. 
Because some plans place a limit on years of service that are credited 
in calculating benefits, it may  in  some instances pay to change jobs 
and begin to accrue benefits in a new plan. This leads to ratios that 
are greater than one in a few instances. The minimum and maximum 
values over all industries arise in anomalous plans, and these should 
not be given much weight: but they do suggest that there is substantial 
variation  among plans  in  this  respect,  as well  as in  other respects 
discussed above. 
Table 10.21  Weighted Average Pension Wealth (or Ratio) at Normal Retirement, 
by Age of Initial Employment, and by Job Change, and by Industry, 
All Plans 
Pension Wealth at Normal 
Retirement Relative to Wealth 




~  Change  Change  Change at 
(No. of  Plans)  31  41  51  at 41  at 51  41 and 51 
All industries (N = 2342) 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Mining (N = 39) 
Construction (N = 9) 
Manufacturing (N =  1297) 
Transportation (N = 328) 
Wholesale trade (N = 100) 
Retail trade (N = 260) 
Finance (N = 7) 
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.67  .80 
.91  1.01 
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10.4.3  Pension Accrual Ratios and Age of Initial Employment 
Pension accrual rates for percent-of-earnings plans with 10-year cliff 
vesting  are  shown in  tables  10.22 and  10.23 for persons  beginning 
employment at ages 41 and 51 respectively. The tables are analogous 
to table 10.1 above, presenting information by plan early and normal 
retirement ages. To provide an easier comparison of the accrual rates 
by  starting age, accrual rates for selected ages  are  shown in  table 
10.24. The numbers are taken from table  10.1, table 10.22, and table 
10.23. Accrual ratios for plans with early and normal retirement at 55 
and  65 respectively are graphed in figure  10.11. The accrual rate at 
vesting  is  the  most  important  difference  across  initial employment 
ages. For example, as shown in table 10.24, the accrual rate at vesting 
is  .24 for persons  beginning employment at  31, it  is  .62 for those 
beginning at age 41, and .92 for those beginning at age 5 1. The differ- 
ence is simply due to the fact that the later the age of  initial employ- 
ment, the nearer is the time of benefit receipt at the age of  vesting. 
The accrual rate at vesting increases with age of  initial employment 
for each early-normal retirement age category. Otherwise, the pattern 
of accrual rates does not vary by starting age, except that the absolute 
value of the rates, both positive and negative, is smaller as the age of 
initial employment increases. Again, this is simply because potential 
benefits are lower with later starting ages and, thus, potential losses 
after the age of early or normal retirement are smaller. Notice that the 
accrual rate after the age of 65 is negative in each case. Plan provisions 
typically make the age of early and normal retirement dependent upon 
age and years of service. Thus in practice, the ages of early and normal 
retirement are typically somewhat higher for persons beginning em- 
ployment at age 51.  But in  no case is the age of normal  retirement 
greater than 65. 
10.5  Pension Accrual Rates and Pension Cost by Sex 
Because women  on average live longer than  men, women  would 
typically receive pension benefits longer than otherwise equivalent men. 
The effect of this difference in life expectancy on pension accrual and 
the value of  pension benefits is considered in this section. The ratios 
of  the weighted average of  the accrued benefits of  women to that of 
men by age are shown in table 10.25 for all plans in the sample. At the 
most common vesting age, 10  years, the ratio is about 1.08, so that 
women’s vested benefits are approximately 8% higher than men’s. The 
ratio increases gradually to about 1.10 at age 60 and about 1.13 at 65. 
If otherwise identical men and women were to work until age 70, the 
average ratio would be  1.17. The ratios do not vary significantly by Table 10.22  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Cliff Vesting, by 
Early and Normal Retirement Age, Starting Job at Age 41 
55155  55160  55165  60160  60165  62162  62165  65165 
Age  (N = 38)  (N = 63)  (N = 576)  (N = 169)  (N = 86)  (N = 27)  (N =  10)  (N = 56) 
50  .618 
51  ,106 
52  ,123 
53  ,141 
54  ,160 
55  .184 
56  ,006 
57  ,002 
58  .0003 
59  -  ,004 
60  -  .010 
61  -  ,016 
62  -  .022 
63  -  .029 
64  -  ,036 
65  -  .043 
66  -.116 
67  -  ,128 
68  -  .I41 
69  -  .154 
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NOTE:  Plans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded. Table 10.23  Weighted Average Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year Clii  Vesting, by  Early 
and Normal Retirement Age, Starting Job at Age 51 
55/55  55/60  55165  60160  60165  62162  62165  65165 
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Table 10.24  Pension Accrual Rates for Percent-of-Earnings Plans with 10-Year 
Cliff Vesting, by  Early and Normal Retirement Age and by  Age of 
Initial Employment, for Selected Ages 
Starting Age  Early-Normal Retirement 
and 
55/55  55/60  55/65  60160  6016.5  62/62  62165  6516.5  Age 
31: 
40  .24 
50  .I4 
55  .26 
60  -  .04 
62  -  .06 
65  -  .09 
66  -  .29 
40  0 
50  .62 
55  .18 
60  -  .01 
62  -  .02 
65  -  .04 
66  -  .I2 
40  0 
50  0 
55  0 
60  .92 
62  .04 
65  .02 







-  .09 
-  .09 





-  .oo 
-  .02 








.07  .03 
.  05  .07 
.10  .15 
.08  .27 
.06  -.09 
.04  -.I2 
.I5  -.I4 
0  0 
.21  .35 
.07  .I1 
.07  .21 
.07  -.02 
.07  p.04 
.I1  -.I9 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
.61  1.04 
.08  .03 
.08  .01 
.08  -.04 
.05  .04 
.03  .07 
.08  .I3 
.17  .24 
.I2  .25 
.11  -.I4 
.09  p.27 
0  0 
.13  .02 
.05  .I0 
.I0  .lX 
.08  22 
.08  -.04 
.06  -.I9 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
.45  .a 
.06  .I7 
.07  .03 
.04  -.06 
.05  .04 
.02  .03 
.04  .07 
.os  .12 
.07  .15 
.01  .21 
.08  -.19 
0  0 
.14  .13 
.03  .05 
.06  .12 
.07  .14 
.03  .20 
.08  -.I2 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
.54  .45 
.10  .10 
.08  .15 
.08  -.07 
early and normal retirement age, and thus a breakdown by plan type 
is not presented. 
10.6  Summary 
The ratios of pension benefit accrual to wage earnings are presented 
for a wide range of  pension plans. Typical plan provisions  provide a 
strong incentive for retirement after the age of plan-normal retirement, 
and several plan types provide a strong incentive for retirement after 
the age of  early retirement. A striking feature of  the incentive effects 
of  pension  plans is their wide variation  among plans.  For example, 
while the average plan may provide reduced but still positive accrual 
after the age of  early retirement, for a large proportion of plans the 
accrual rate after this age is very negative. It would not be unusual for 
the reduction in pension benefit accrual after the age of early retirement 331  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
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AGE 
Fig. 10.11  Weighted average accrual rates for percent-of-earnings plans 
with 10-year cliff vesting, early retirement at 55, and normal 
retirement at 65, by age started job. (Note: Plans with early 
or normal retirement supplements are excluded.) 
Table 10.25  The Ratio of Accrued Pension Benefits of Women to That of  Men, 
by Age, All Plans 
Age  Ratio  Age  Ratio 
31  1  51  1.109 
32  1  52  1.106 
33  1  53  1.103 
34  1  54  1.099 
35  1.032  55  1.094 
36  1.030  56  1.096 
37  1.032  57  1.098 
38  1.037  58  1.101 
39  1.036  59  1.103 
40  1.082  60  1.102 
41  1.083  61  1.108 
42  1.085  62  1.113 
43  1.087  63  1.120 
44  1.089  64  1.126 
45  1.091  65  1.131 
46  1.094  66  1.138 
47  1.096  67  1.145 
48  1.099  68  1.153 
49  1.102  69  1.161 
50  1.105  70  1.170 
NOTE:  There are 2342 plans. Starting age is 3  1, 332  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
to be equivalent  to a 30% reduction  in wage earnings. Thus even a 
relatively small proportion of plans with such benefit losses could have 
a substantial effect on aggregate labor force participation rates of older 
workers. The accrual rate at the age of vesting can range from as low 
as 2%  of wage earnings in that year to as high as 100% of wage earnings, 
depending upon the plan type and on the age of  initial employment. 
Thus for some employees, vesting could be a very important deter- 
minant of labor force participation decisions. Special early and normal 
retirement provisions may also add very substantially to accrued pen- 
sion wealth  at  particular  ages  and may  thus  encourage workers  to 
remain with afirm until these benefits are received. The accrual profiles 
under flat benefit plans seem very similar to the accruals under percent- 
of-earnings plans, if  one assumes that the flat benefit is increased to 
keep pace with the rate of inflation. Given early and normal retirement 
ages, there is little difference in plan accrual profiles by industry or by 
occupation. Differences in pension benefits by industry depend more 
on the type of plan than on variations among plans with the same basic 
provisions.  While  the expected  loss in  pension  benefits due to job 
change is apparently relatively  small in  many instances,  it is  rather 
large in others, and there is very wide variation among plans with the 
loss very high in some cases and, indeed, in other cases a gain may be 
had by changing jobs. In addition, accrued benefits at the age of re- 
tirement are typically very much lower with job change than if a person 
remains on the same job. Because women typically live longer than 
men, accrued pension benefits at any age are higher for women than 
for men, about  13% on average at age 65, for example. In short, the 
evidence suggests that the rapid increase in pension plan coverage over 
the past  two or three decades may well have contributed very sub- 
stantially to the reduction in the labor force participation of older work- 
ers during this period. The plans may also have an important effect on 
labor mobility. 
Appendix 
The  source  of  discontinuities in  age accrual profiles  is  clarified by 
considering  a simple earnings-related  defined benefit plan  with cliff 
vesting at 10 years of service. Vested accrued benefits are clearly zero 
prior to the age at which the worker has 10 years of  credited service 
in the plan. Let R(a,t)  denote the ratio of Z(a) to W(a)  for a worker age 
a with t years of tenure, where Z(a) is defined in  (1) in the text. Then 333  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
R(a,t)  is zero for t I  9. If a person age a with 9 years of service works 
an additional year, the ratio of the increment to the wage, W(a),  is 
(Alj  R(a,9)  = 
In (Al), B(a,t)  is the retirement benefit available to the worker who 
terminates employment with the plan sponsor at age a after t years of 
service, but  who delays receipt  of  pension  benefits until the plan's 
normal retirement age. The normal and early retirement ages assumed 
for this stylized plan are 65 and 55, respectively. Terminating workers 
in this example are eligible for early retirement benefits.  Our hypo- 
thetical plan reduces benefits by d%  for each year that early retirement 
preceeds normal retirement. The benefit reduction rate, d, is assumed 
to be less than the actuarial fair rate. 
The function A(55) is the actuarial discount factor that transforms 
benefit flows initiating at age 55 into expected stocks of pension wealth 
at age 55. Expectations here are taken with respect to longevity. Thus 
A(55) is the annuity value of a dollar's worth of pension benefits to be 
received  each year  until  death, beginning at age 55. For  simplicity 
assume that the probability of dying prior to age 55 is zero. Hence the 
present value at age a of A(55) is A(a) = A(55) (1  + Y)-(~~-")  for a I  55. 
If pension benefits are determined as a constant A times the product 
of final year's earnings and service, and there is no offset for receipt 
of social security benefits, B(a,t)  is simply 
(A21  B(a,  t) =  A W(a)t 
and 
B(n,t)A(55) (1  + 6)-l0  (1  + r)-[55-(a+l)l 
W(a) 
W(a +  1) 
W(a) 
(A3)  R(a,9) = A(l  + &lo  (I + r)-[55-(a+1)1A(55)10 
R(a,t),  for t increasing paripassus with age, is zero prior to t equals 
9 and jumps at t equals 9 to the value given in (A3). Cliff vesting thus 
produces spikes in the accrual profiles such as that in figure 5.1 at 10 
years of service. Between the age at cliff vesting and age 55 pension 
wealth, Pw(a),  is given by 
(A4)  Pw(a) = AW(a)(l  +  d)-'O  (1 + r)-(ss-n)A(55)t, 
and the increment to pension wealth Z(a) divided by the age W(a)  is 
given by 
(A5)  R(a,t) = h(1  + &lo  (1  + 
W(U + 1) t  +  1 
Wa)  t 
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Equations  (A3) and (A5) suggest a drop in  R(a,t) as a  increases to 
a  + 1 concurrent with an increase in  t from 9 to 10. Equation (A5) 
will be positive if  the bracketed term exceeds zero. This will be the 
case if the percentage increase in the wage plus the percentage increase 
in years  employed  (lit) is  greater than  zero. Assuming the term  in 
brackets is positive and is roughly constant, R(a,t)  will increase ex- 
ponentially  due  to  the  exponential  decline  in  the  discount  factor, 
(1 + Y)-L~~-(~+~)I,  as a approaches 55. 
If  the value of  d is considerably less than actuarially fair, a discon- 
tinuity in R(a,t)  occurs at the early retirement age, 55. At ages 55 and 
56 we have 




Pw(56) = XW(56)(1  + d)p9A(56)(t  +  1). 
Assuming wage growth at 54 is close to that at 55 and A(56) ap- 
proximately equals A(55),  then R(55,t)  primarily differs from R(54,t - 1) 
because the first term in the bracket in (7) is now multiplied by (1  + d) 
while the second term, -  1, is multiplied by  (1 + r). Since r exceeds 
d by assumption, R(55,t) can easily be less than R(54,t - 1). Indeed, 
this change in the functional form of  R(a,t) can produce sharp drops 
in accrual rates at the early retirement age for a host of pension plans 
and a range of realistic economic assumptions. 
It is important to realize that the early retirement reduction, lower 
wages, and one less year of  tenure yield lower benefits at 55 than at 
56. The early retirement reduction reduces benefits at rate d. But if 
benefits were taken at 55 they could accrue interest at rate Y.  Thus by 
forgoing the early retirement option of  receiving benefits at 55, one 
incurs a cost that depends on the difference r - d. If  this loss is not 
offset by the increase due to wage growth and one year of additional 
tenure, there will be a drop in the benefit accrual rate between 55 and 
56. 
The same considerations pertain  to benefit increments between 56 
and 65. Recall that we have assumed a less than fair early retirement 
reduction so that benefits accrued before 55 are valued based on the 
assumption that benefits are received starting at the age that  yields 
maximum pension wealth. The optimum time to receive benefits ac- 335  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
crued between 55 and 56 is 56, between 56 and 57 is 57, and so forth. 
But to gain benefits from working another year, it is necessary to forgo 
the option of immediately taking accrued benefits at an advantageous 
reduction rate. 
Between ages 56 and 65, R(a,t)  equals 
(A9)  R(a,t) + X(l  + d)  (65-a)  (1 + r)  A(a)f 
W(a + 1) (t + 1) A(a + I) (1 + 6)  [  W(a)  r  A(a)  -1-  (1 + r) 
In contrast to the R(a,t) formula  in  (AS) that  applies to the period 
between cliff vesting and early retirement, (A9) indicates that the ac- 
tuarial reduction factor d, rather than the interest rate r, imparts an 
upward tilt in the R(a,r) profile between early and normal retirement, 
as long as the term in brackets is positive. In (A9) as in (A5) and (A8) 
the accrual rate, R(a,r),  is an increasing function of the rate of nominal 
wage growth. Larger nominal interest rates reduce accrual rates at all 
ages, with a negative interaction with age prior to early retirement. 
While the expression (A5) is unlikely to be negative, large differences 
between wage growth and the interest rate r can yield negative incre- 
ments in pension wealth after the early retirement age. To  a first ap- 
proximation, the bracketed term in equation (A9) will  be positive if 
AWIW  + llr > r -  d, where AWIW is the percentage increase in wages 
and llt is the percentage increase in tenure. It is easy to see, however, 
that  low  wage  growth  and  high  interest  rates  will  yield  negative 
increments. 
Pension accrual after normal retirement can be significantly negative. 
Assume that our hypothetical plan neither credits service after normal 
retirement nor provides an actuarial increase in benefits for postponing 
benefit receipt beyond the normal retirement age. In this case R(a,t) 
after normal retirement is given by 
where t* equals the worker's service prior to age 65. Note that for the 
following reasonable parameter values-X  = .02, t* = 30, A(a) = 15, 
r  = .04, and A(a + 1) = 14-R(a,t)  = -  .96, a quite substantial neg- 
ative accrual ratio. 
While the preceding formulas suggest the general shape of accrual 
rate profiles, there are few earnings-based plans with features as simple 
as the one considered here. In addition to more complicated rules for 
plan participation and vesting that often involve age as well as service 
requirements, there are a variety of  methods of computing earnings 
bases, including career averages  and averages of  earnings, possibly 336  Laurence J. Kotlikoff and David A. Wise 
highest earnings, over a specified period or number of years. Reduction 
rates for early retirement are often a specified function of age, if  not 
length  of service.  Some plans allow no further accrual after a given 
number of years of service. Roughly 30% of defined benefit participants 
belong to plans that are integrated with social security, and the form 
of “integration”  can have an important effect on the pattern of benefit 
accrual. Other plans, in  particular  those with  social  security offset 
formulas, provide supplemental benefits for early retirees prior to their 
receipt of social security benefits. In addition to these earnings-related 
plans, a significant number of plans covering  over  40% of defined benefit 
participants  calculate  benefits  independent of the participant’s  earn- 
ings. Finally, there are plans that specify minimum and maximum ben- 
efit levels. 
Notes 
1. Only plans with incomplete or inconsistent information were classified by 
the BLS as unusable. 
2. Our calculations ignore service requirements for early retirement, since 
this inclusion could have considerably complicated our accrual computations. 
Excluding early retirement service requirements from the analysis is not likely 
to alter the results significantly. Virtually all workers covered by such require- 
ments are enrolled in plans with early retirement service requirements of  15 
years or less (Kotlikoff and Smith 1983). 
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Comment  Thomas A. Gustafson 
This paper  reports  on  extensive  simulation exercises  exploring the 
detailed structure of  pension accrual profiles by age. It builds directly 
on work  by  the same authors presented  in a paper entitled  “Labor 
Compensation and the Structure of  Private Pension Plans: Evidence 
for Contractual versus Spot Labor Markets” (Kotlikoff and Wise 1984). 
Both papers employ information on the structure of a large number of 
actual pension plans from the 1979 Level of Benefits survey prepared 
by the United States Department of Labor. In both papers, information 
on individual plans was weighted by the number of plan participants. 
Unfortunately, information on the wage profiles of plan participants, 
which would be desirable for calculating pension profiles, is not avail- 
able because of  privacy  restrictions. The authors instead used  wage 
profiles derived from the Retirement History Survey to represent work- 
ers in the plans under investigation. 
The first paper found age profiles of pension accruals characterized 
by a number of “spikes” at key ages-the  age of vesting, of eligibility 
for early retirement benefits, and of  eligibility for normal retirement. 
The authors argue that these lumpy pension profiles are inconsistent 
with a spot market interpretation of  the operation of labor markets, 
since no compensating troughs are observed in wage profiles. 
Findings presented in the present paper are generally consistent with 
the first. The same sort of profiles are observed; the authors also present 
evidence on the rather  substantial dispersal  to be found around the 
average pattern. This paper extends the limited empirical analysis con- 
tained in the first paper to explore a number of additional dimensions 
of pension profiles. 
First, the authors examine accrual ratios beyond the normal retire- 
ment age for the plans, and discover substantial discontinuities at the 
age of  normal retirement and negative values in the post-normal-re- 
tirement-age range. Second, they examine differences in profiles across 
industries and occupations. They discover that most apparent differ- 
ences result from the distribution across industries and occupations of 
plans  with particular configurations  of  early  and  normal  retirement 
ages, but that industry and occupation do not seem to matter much 
once account is taken of plan type. 
Third, they examine early and normal retirement supplements, and 
find these features accentuate the “spikes” on the profiles at the ages 
they become available. Fourth, they examine the effect of offsets for 
Thomas A. Gustafson is a staff economist with the Office of  the Assistant Secretary 
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social security benefits. Offset provisions vary widely, but in general 
plans without offsets have higher accrual profiles and higher spikes at 
vesting. Fifth, they provide information on flat benefit plans; the prior 
analysis was limited to earnings-related plans.  The profiles observed 
for these plans  are very similar to those for earnings-related  plans, 
given an assumption that the flat benefit increases in line with a rate 
of inflation of 6%. 
Finally, the paper gives new evidence on the effect of a job change 
late in life, which can be dramatic, and on the effect of differences in 
life expectancies of men and women on overall pension benefits, which 
can result in differences of  10% or more in total lifetime benefits. 
These results reflect an obviously extensive encounter with the data, 
and the authors are to be commended for their energy in this exercise. 
While the effort extends our knowledge beyond  its precedessor and 
Lazear’s earlier paper (1983), it cannot be described as a dramatic leap 
forward. The results are simulations based on data on real plans, but 
they rely on earnings profiles that are only hypothetically  connected 
to the information on the plans. As mentioned above, nothing better 
was available, but the results cannot be seen as having the same reli- 
ability as would calculations involving actual microdata on individuals. 
An additional drawback is that Kotlikoff and Wise are in fact looking 
at only a relatively small portion of pension plans. The level-of-benefits 
data are restricted to private plans with certain minimum size restric- 
tions.  The authors chose to analyze, however, only a subset of  the 
plans in  the data set; almost all the analysis in this paper treats only 
defined benefit plans with 10-year cliff vesting. In 1977, plans with this 
vesting schedule represented only about 28% of private defined benefit 
plans; these plans, however, included 65% of  plan participants (see 
Kotlikoff and Smith 1983, p. 184). 
Limiting the analysis to plans with cliff vesting serves to dramatize 
the size of the spike in the accrual profile at the age of  vesting; plans 
with more gradual, “graded”  vesting schedules, such as the “rule of 
45”  or the “40-5-10”  rule, should have a much flatter accrual profile 
in  the early years of service. The profiles with cliff vesting are thus 
most at variance with a spot labor market interpretation. Restricting 
the analysis to this group of plans, however, means the profiles are not 
necessarily indicative of the experience of many workers, and the reader 
should be cautioned to interpret the results presented as suggestive of 
a modal pattern, rather than necessarily an average, “normal,” or uni- 
versal pattern. 
The analysis does not treat three major types of  plans: (1) defined 
benefit plans with other than  10-year cliff vesting, (2) defined contri- 
bution plans, and (3) public plans. Especially considering the evidence 
presented by the authors about extent of variability around the average 339  The Incentive Effects of Private Pension Plans 
pattern, these restrictions are limiting. In particular, the authors’ claim 
that they are looking at the whole universe of defined benefit pension 
plans is overstated. 
I find the discussion of  spot labor markets not particularly enlight- 
ening, mostly because in this context the spot market model is very 
much a straw man, a hollow foe whose defeat gives little surprise and 
also little indication of the mettle of the victor. Of course, the pension 
accrual profiles might be less interesting if  one rejected this model in 
advance. It is the spot market model that demands attention to vesting, 
as opposed to some other measure of pension accruals. A 9-year vet- 
eran in a plan with  10-year cliff vesting may be thought of  as having 
substantial expectations of pension  benefits,  even though they have 
not yet been given the legal status we call “vested.”  A less rigorous 
measure of  expectations, however, would mean  a smoother accrual 
profile, at least in the early years. 
Finally, the results presented by Kotlikoff and Wise, and those by 
Lazear as well, refer only to pension accruals and ignore all other fringe 
benefits.  Let me cautiously advance the hypothesis that other fringe 
benefits may  exhibit age-related patterns that are of interest in this 
context. In particular, the cost of providing health benefits probably 
exhibits  a rising profile with the age of the worker. (Of  course, the 
extent to which the firm perceives this rise may depend on the bargain 
it makes with its health insurance carrier.) This profile may even rise 
steeply in the years following early retirement, just when we observe 
pension accruals falling off; in such a case, the sum of declining pension 
accruals and rising health benefits might be more nearly straight. This 
question seems to deserve further attention. 
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